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Abstract 
 
Increasing  fiscal  pressure  has  forced  local  governments  to  seek  new  sources  of 
autonomous  revenues  for  financing  public  services.  Charging  users  of  social 
services has been modest, but with an aging society and growing social costs, this 
option needs to be reconsidered. This paper combines the results of the survey on 
the  application  of  user  charges  on  local  social  services  in  Estonian  local 
governments (LGs) with the official financial and population statistics in order to 
discover trends and explore factors determining the application of user charges in a 
small,  unitary,  highly  centralised,  post-soviet  country.  We  conclude  that  user 
charges are mainly considered as a source of information and additional income to 
partially cover service costs – the possibilities of increased efficiency and demand 
control  have  remained  undervalued.  The  probability  of  charging  users  of  social 
services tends to be greater if the income level of inhabitants is higher, reflecting the 
‘ability  to  pay’  principle.  Charging  users  is  more  probable  in  the  municipalities 
where  the  social  costs  are  higher  in  volume  or  in  proportion  to  the  budget’s 
expenditures. 
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Introduction  
 
User  charges  may  be  defined  as prices of  publicly  provided  goods and  services 
(Wagner, 1991; B￶s 1986). In considering the public finance theory such charges 
could be levied on the majority of local government services which are not pure 
public goods. In this respect social services are good candidates for the application 
of  user  charges  as  they  are  individual-based,  their  consumption  is  rival  and 
excludable. 
 
In  a  global  competitive  environment,  local  governments  are  progressively 
experiencing difficulties in collecting their own revenues and are largely dependent 
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on  central  government  grants.  The  introduction  of  user  charges  may  benefit  the 
budgetary  situation  in  ceteris  paribus  and  increase  the  efficiency  of  service 
provision. As social services represent a large share of the public services offered by 
municipalities, and with the aging of societies, this burden is increasing; introducing 
at least partial cost coverage by users would help to reduce the budgetary burden of 
local governments. On the other hand, a growing focus on customer demand for 
public  services  and  service  quality,  which  are  characteristic  to  the  New  Public 
Management,  emphasise  the  need  to  interlink  the  financing  and  consumption  of 
public  services.  User  charges  provide  a  good  option  for  this  by  reflecting  the 
consumers’ willingness to pay. However, the introduction of new charges may not 
be  easy:  following  the  path  dependency  from  the  era  of  the  Soviet  Union these 
services are in general offered free of charge. 
 
In this paper, we seek to identify the possibilities for introducing user charges in the 
case of social services in a small, unitary, highly centralised, post-soviet country. 
This requires an understanding of the determinants of charging the users of social 
services.  We  use  the  opportunity  of  combining  a  unique  survey  database  with 
official financial and population data from Statistics Estonia to explore this question. 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first part provides a theoretical overview 
of motivations and limitations for introducing user charges. The second part gives a 
short overview of the application of user charges in the Estonian context, including 
main revenue sources of Estonian local governments as well as their jurisdiction 
with  respect  to  the  provision  of  social  services.  Data  and  methodology  of  the 
empirical analysis are explained in the third part of the paper. The last part deals 
with the analysis of determinants of the user charging policies. Firstly, principles 
and preconditions from the viewpoint of the local governments’ (LG) are explored. 
The trends are further tested with statistical data analysis. 
 
1. Theoretical foundations of applying user charges 
 
Although  the  term  “user  charges”  is  widely  used  by  governments  and  scholarly 
discussions, there is no universal agreement about the exact meaning of this term. 
Most commonly, user charges are defined as prices that government requests from 
users of specific services provided by the public sector (see e.g. B￶s, 1986; Wagner, 
1991; Bohley, 2003). The application of user charges assumes that the goods and 
services in question possess some private good characteristic – the consumers who 
do not pay can be excluded from the consumption and the consumers are in rivalry 
for the consumption of goods and services. Nevertheless, user charges should be 
clearly distinguished from prices in the private sector and they differ in that they are 
collected by public bodies and thus their application follows the traditional aims, 
which are characteristic of the public sector (Bohley, 2003). Bailey (1999) explains 
that using the term “charge” instead of “price” reflects the administrative, rather than 
market based, determination of payments. However, many researchers and theories, 
especially  in  continental  Europe,  still  use  the  term  “public  prices”  to  deal  with 
publicly charged goods and services. 
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The discussion about public pricing has a long economic history. During the last 100 
years there have been a number of outstanding publications forming the classics of 
public  economics.  Nevertheless,  practical  experience  in  the  application  of  user 
charging has been rather diverse and inconsistent across countries, as well as across 
service fields. For example, public utilities such as electricity, water, traffic, and 
refuse collection are publicly priced in most Western Economies; social services, 
education, and health are less common candidates (B￶s, 1986). 
 
The  general  public  finance  theory  suggests  that,  to  the  fullest  extent  possible, 
services that the government provides should be financed by user charges and fees to 
ensure the effective provision of goods and services (see e.g. B￶s, 1986; Bailey, 
1999). Charges should be levied on those who receive the benefits from services 
wherever the government can identify such beneficiaries.  Local  taxes and grants 
should  only  be  used  to  part-finance  those  services  which  are  subject  to  market 
failures  fulfilling  the  assumptions  of  non-rivalry  and  non-excludability  (Bailey, 
1999; Bohley, 2003). 
 
Charging users of services has many advantages. First, user charges allow residents 
and businesses to know how much they are paying for the services that they receive 
from  local  governments.  Based  on  the  services provided  and  the  costs incurred, 
residents and businesses can therefore make efficient decisions about how much to 
consume. When consumers do not know the cost, they are likely to consume more or 
less than  what is  efficient leading to expansion and redistribution of the service 
(Wagner,  1976;  Reddy,  Vandemoortele,  1996;  Bailey,  1999;  Bird,  Vaillancourt, 
2006; Bl￶chliger, 2008). On the other hand, service-providers will only be made 
more responsive to service users if their revenues are directly dependent upon the 
volume of use of their services. The market mechanism is, in this respect, leading to 
a situation where the poor quality of services leads to a loss of revenues from sales 
and thereby forces the service provider to care about the production costs as well as 
the quality of the service (Bailey, 1999). 
 
Second, if user charges are established following the equality principle, they may 
serve information purposes. They provide the government with information about 
the quantity and quality of goods and services that people want and thus, for what 
they are willing to pay. Without direct charging, citizens do not have a mechanism 
(except for voting every few years) to register their demand for local goods and 
services (Darby, Muscatelli, Roy, 2003; Bohley, 2003; Bird, Vaillancourt, 2006). 
 
Third, user charges satisfy the equality principle when equity is based on benefits 
received.  All  individuals  pay  an  amount  that  reflects  the  additional  benefit  they 
receive from a unit of the good or service (Bird, Vaillancourt, 2006). This benefit 
principle had already been emphasised by Oates in 1972. According to him public 
expenditures should be assigned in a way that provision of public services is made 
by the jurisdiction representing the smallest possible area over which the benefits are 
distributed. 
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Fourth, user charges may help to raise revenue in order to increase public service 
quality (Bl￶chliger, 2008). 
 
User charges designed in accordance with the equality principle will, in general, 
reflect  the  marginal  cost  of  providing  the  service  (Bohley,  2003).  However,  the 
marginal  cost  of  services  may  vary  considerably  in  different  municipalities,  for 
example transport costs depend on the distances as well as population concentration 
within the municipality, availability of hospitals or care institutions and so on. In 
some cases this might lead to the situation where, if the marginal cost is charged, 
some  people  might  not  be  able  to  pay  it  and  would  be  likely  to  leave  these 
communities if they are not subsidized. In other words, charging an amount that 
reflects the true marginal cost of providing services to remote areas could reduce the 
number of people living there (Bird, Vaillancourt, 2006). Hence, one could expect 
that user charges are applied less in remote areas and favoured more in urban areas 
and in more developed regions where the income level of inhabitants is higher. 
 
Another  problem  with  charging  for  services concerns the  cost of  administration. 
Both  determining  the  appropriate  amount  of  the  charge  and  enforcing  it  can  be 
costly. If the administrative costs exceed the revenues collected, user charges may 
not  be  worthwhile  (Bird,  Vaillancourt,  2006).  This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
charging users would assume a critical mass of users. 
 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  a  shared  understanding  that  market  mechanisms  may 
jeopardise equal and universal access to public services (Reddy, Vandemoortele, 
1996; Bailey, 1999; Bl￶chliger, 2008). Thus it is expected that local governments 
should make an exemption for those low-income households who are unable to pay 
the charges requested, that is to take into account the users’ ability to pay. Darby, 
Muscatelli and Roy (2003) emphasise also that user charging will be viable only if 
the  costs  of  collection  and  of  compensation  through  the  benefit  system  are  low 
relative to the sums that can be levied and the efficiency gains that result. Countries 
that have tried to increase reliance on fees and charges have  generally aimed at 
striking  a  balance  between  co-payment  and  maximum  contribution  to  avoid 
imposing unduly high expenses on some households. 
 
Based on the above, the following hypotheses were raised. 
  Municipalities where the average income level of inhabitants is higher tend to 
employ user charges more because the ability to pay of potential service-users 
is presumably higher. 
  Larger municipalities tend to apply user charges more as the efficiency gains 
expected  from  charging  the  users  would  be  larger  (as  marginal  costs  for 
providing services are lower and thus the potential gain from introducing a user 
charge would be larger). 
 
In  addition,  positive  theories  of  fees  point  out  several  other  factors  that  may 
influence fees. Friedrich et al. (2004) suggest indicators for success in competition 
such as market shares, outputs, indicators as employment, production, migration, 126 
growth rates, budget sizes; political indicators such as number of votes; as well as 
objective functions of management and owners in fee-generating institutions. 
 
2. Framework of LG financing and of social service provision in Estonia 
2.1. Position of user charges in financing Estonian local governments 
 
As the legal, statistical and financial definition of user charges may be very nation-
specific, it is quite difficult to estimate the share of user charges in an international 
perspective. According to Bl￶chliger (2008) user charges make up a considerable 
part  of  public  sector  revenue  in  some  countries,  accounting  for  2.3%  of  GDP. 
Finland, New Zealand and Sweden have the highest charge-to-GDP ratio. In a few 
countries revenue from user charges even exceeds revenue from local taxes (Greece, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands). Tax and revenues from user charges are positively 
correlated,  that  is  sub-central  governments  with  a  higher  tax  share  tend  to  have 
higher user charges. Whilst user charge structure across government function is not 
available, questionnaire responses suggest that most user charges at the sub-central 
level are levied for technical services such as public transport, water, and waste 
collection.  For  a  more  detailed  overview  please  consult  Bl￶chliger  (2008).  The 
increasing importance of fees is also predicted by Friedrich et al. (2004) in Britain, 
Germany, Switzerland, and Poland. 
 
In Estonia the term “user charges” is not explicitly used in governmental accounts. 
Instead, the accounting system provides information on public sector sales of goods 
and  services  for  markets  −  market  output
4.  The  share  of  the  market  output  in 
Estonian LG revenues is about 11%, being the third largest source of local revenues. 
 
The major part of LG revenues in Estonia comes mainly from personal income tax 
(see Graph 1), which in 2010 reached 46% of total LG revenues. Personal income 
tax is a centrally administered tax, central government determines the tax base, tax 
rates, and tax benefits. Local governments are granted a fixed share of residents’ 
income. The share was reduced in 2009 from 11,8% to 11,4% whereas the income 
tax rate is 21%. The costs of tax threshold and tax exemptions are borne by central 
government. 
 
The second largest income of LGs is state grants (34% of total revenues), which are 
divided between conditional and unconditional transfers. Conditional transfers are 
allocations in the form of block grants as well as transfers from different ministries 
to  perform  state  functions  at  the  local  level.  These  funds  include  transfers  for 
teachers’  salaries,  subsistence  benefits,  and  so  on.  Unconditional  transfers  are 
allocated  to  the  local  governments  as  equalisation  grants  to  balance  excessive 
differences among the revenue bases of different local authorities and to provide 
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also the weakest  municipalities with the possibility of rendering adequate public 
services to their inhabitants. 
 
Local taxes as a traditional source of LG own revenues play only a minor role in 
Estonian LG revenues accounting for approximately 1% of total revenues. 
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Graph 1. Local government revenues in Estonia, 2010 (own calculations, data from 
Statistics Estonia). 
 
Consequently, revenues of local governments in Estonia are in large part controlled 
by central government. More extensive employment of user charges could ceteris 
paribus allow an increase in the revenue autonomy of the LGs and improve the 
quality as well as adequacy of public services provided at the local level. 
 
The  application  of  user  charges  is  also  unequal  –  there  are  services  where  the 
application of charges is a norm (for example water and sewerage), but there are 
fields  like  social  services  where  the  share  of  revenues  remains  well  below  the 
expenditure levels. The largest part of market output consists mainly of revenues 
from education (including kindergarten fees, fees for kindergarten and school food) 
as well as technical services such as sewerage, waste collection and other utilities 
(see Graph 3). 
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Graph 2. Division of sales revenues between the service areas, 2010 (Ministry of 
Finance of Estonia, own calculations). 
 
2.2. Overview of the framework of social service provision by local 
governments in Estonia 
 
Provision  of  social  services  by  local  governments  is  regulated  by  the  Local 
Government  Organisation  Act  (LGOA)  and  the  Law  of  Social  Welfare  (LSW). 
LGOA  determines  the  functions,  responsibilities,  and  organisation  of  local 
authorities and the relations of local authorities with one another and with central 
governmental  institutions.  In  addition,  the  Act  provides  the  basis  for  the 
participation  of  local  governments  in  economic  activities,  the  procedure  of  the 
formation of municipal districts, the general structure of the local council, and so on, 
thus creating a basis for different forms of service provision. 
 
Responsibilities  of  local  governments  within  the  area  of  social  welfare  include 
taking care of the elderly and disabled as well as other persons in need of assistance. 
The law indicates the following services (LSW, www.riik.ee) that LGs are obliged 
to offer and finance: 
  social counselling – advising persons on their social rights and assistance in 
resolving specific problems; 
  elderly day care centres – intended as a social meeting point for the elderly 
where recreational activities and different social services are provided; 
  home  care  –  includes  home  assistance  and  nursing  assistance  in  the  home 
environment, which helps the person in need to cope in his or her familiar, 
accustomed environment; 129 
  home  child  care  –  service  supporting  the  parent’s  employment,  studying  or 
coping (it does not include municipal kindergartens which are regulated by a 
separate law); 
  personal assistant – for assisting a disabled person and reducing the care-giving 
workload on his or her family members; 
  social housing – providing housing for individuals and families who are not 
capable or able to procure it themselves; 
  adapting a dwelling – for those who have difficulties moving around in their 
dwelling or coping; 
  nursing home care – for those who need auxiliary assistance and nursing care 
service in a social welfare institution. 
 
Of course, municipalities may also provide supplementary social services at their 
discretion in addition to the aforementioned. 
 
LGOA allows for a significant variation of juridical forms of service provision. LGs 
might  offer  the  services  themselves  either  by  employing  specialists  directly  or 
creating institutions such as foundations, non-profit or profit organisations owned by 
LGs to provide the service on behalf of the LG. This is mostly used in the case of 
home care services, social transport, and elderly day-care services. At the same time, 
the LGs have the option of delegating the service provision to non-governmental 
bodies. This is used for example in the case of shelters or child care. LGs can also 
outsource the service to the private sector. This is used for example in the case of 
personal assistant services. But local governments can also buy the service either 
from other municipalities or from the private sector at market prices. This is most 
common in the case of nursing homes, which might be either private or municipal. 
The variety in types of service provided makes it difficult to find an appropriate way 
of introducing charges. However, nursing homes provide a good example of a fee-
based service. In general the nursing homes, either municipal or privately owned, 
charge up to 85-95% of the service user’s income for the service they provide. The 
rest of the user charge is either covered by the family of the service-user or by the 
LG. 
 
In general, and characteristic of a post-soviet country, fee setting is still very vague 
and unregulated as the attempts of fee application have such a short history. The 
right  to  set  fees  relies  on  the  municipal  government,  who  may  delegate  the  fee 
setting right to municipal agencies (LGOA,§31). In some cases, like kindergarten 
participation fees, the fees are partially regulated by central laws. There are also 
services which operate under a cost coverage rule such as public utilities. In the case 
of  social  services  there  is  no  central  regulation  on  fee  setting.  This  results  in 
divergent practises of fee setting even within municipalities – in the case of some 
services  fees  are  determined  by  the  local  enterprises  or  set  by  the  municipal 
government, in other cases they are determined by the private or non-governmental 
institutions providing the services. 
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3. Data and methodology 
 
The  data  used  for  distinguishing  Estonian  municipalities  that  charge  users  of 
personal social services from those that do not charge users is obtained from the 
survey  “Charging  individuals  and/or  their  families  for  social  services  by  local 
governments”  (“Kohaliku  omavalitsuse  poolt  isikult  ja/või  perekonnalt 
sotsiaalteenuste eest tasu nõudmine”) carried out by the Praxis Centre for Policy 
Studies in 2010-2011 at the request of the Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia. The 
reason  for  using  data  from  this  survey  is  that  there  are  no  statistics  about  user 
charges imposed on social services by the LGs in Estonia. The questionnaire was 
sent to all 226 LGs in November 2010; the response rate was 100%. 
 
Persons responsible for the management of social affairs in the municipalities were 
asked whether they charge users and/or their families for social services provided by 
the municipality. It is important to emphasise that the answer was purely defined by 
the local representatives themselves and is therefore a subjective view. In the case of 
some services, such as nursing home care where the service is often purchased from 
the private sector or from other municipalities, or social and municipal housing, 
where the administration is carried out by different officials or departments, results 
might be somewhat biased and the number of LGs where users are requested to pay 
fees might be higher. The survey results were explored and clarified during the 20 
in-depth interviews carried out with representatives of the local governments and 
service providers. 
 
For the statistical analysis, one of the LGs that charges users had to be removed 
from the database because of the amalgamation of two municipalities in autumn 
2009. As the survey was conducted in 2010 but the other statistical data is from 
2009, we did not have data for the amalgamated municipality. Therefore the number 
of municipalities included in the statistical analysis is 225. 
 
The variables describing municipality characteristics were obtained from Statistics 
Estonia. The data for 2009 was used because no 2010 data was available for most of 
the  variables  at  the  time  the  analysis  was conducted.  The  choice  of  variables  is 
dictated by the fact that the social services included in the study are mainly targeted 
at the elderly and/or disabled people. The selection of variables was constrained by 
data  availability.  The  variables  included  in  the  study  are:  population,  elderly 
population
5,  income  level  of  inhabitants,  budget  volume,  importance  of  social 
sphere, importance of social costs for the elderly and disabled, and volume of social 
costs for the elderly and disabled.  Population  (popul)  describes  the  number  of 
inhabitants in the municipality on 1st January 2009. Elderly population (popul65) 
describes  the  relative  proportion  of  people  over  65  years  of  age  in  the  whole 
population  of  the  municipality  on  1st  January  2009.  Additionally  the  relative 
proportion of very old people (over 85 years of age) is included in the analysis 
(popul85) as these people are supposedly the main target group of most personal 
social services included in the study. Income level of inhabitants (INC) is calculated 
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as the local budget receipts from personal income tax per inhabitant. This indicator 
is  chosen  because  the  average  income  data  of  individuals  is  not  available  by 
municipality.  Budget  volume  (budgvol)  describes  the  overall  wealth  of  the 
municipality and is calculated as local budget expenditures per inhabitant, whereby 
local  budget  expenditures  are  without  allocations  for  investments  from  the  state 
budget. These allocations are excluded because they are made for specific purposes 
and  may  constitute  a  significant  proportion  of  the  local  budget  of  a  small 
municipality in a single year. Importance of social sphere (socimport) is calculated 
as  the  proportion  of  social  protection  expenditures  from  the  local  budget’s  total 
expenditures without allocations for investments from the state budget. Importance 
of social costs for elderly and disabled (eldsocimport) is calculated as the proportion 
of these expenditures from the local budget’s total expenditures without allocations 
for investments from the state budget. Volume of social costs for the elderly and 
disabled (socvolpop65) are calculated as social expenditures for elderly and disabled 
people per elderly inhabitant (i.e. over 65 years of age). Additionally the costs for 
elderly and disabled people per inhabitant over 85 years of age (socvolpop85) are 
calculated. 
 
In the statistical analysis firstly the hypotheses were tested that the variables chosen 
(population,  elderly  population,  income  level  of  inhabitants,  budget  volume, 
importance of social sphere, importance of social costs for the elderly and disabled, 
and volume of social costs for the elderly and disabled) have different means in the 
two relevant groups of municipalities (LGs charging users of local social services 
and  LGs  not  charging  users  of  local  social  services).  As  the  tests  of  normality 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov)  showed  that  normal  distribution  cannot  be  assumed,  the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-Test was used for testing these hypotheses. 
 
As  a  second  step  a  logistic  regression  analysis  was  used  for  estimating  the 
probability  that  a  municipality  charges  users  of  personal  social  services  and  for 
identifying the variables relevant for this prediction. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. General attitudes towards charging for local social services 
 
According to the survey users are charged for at least one kind of social service in 
153 municipalities, that is in 68% of all LGs. 73 municipalities (32% of all LGs) 
claim not to charge for any social services that are provided by the municipality. 
 
The  practice  of  charging  users  of  social  services  is  rather  divergent  among  the 
service fields as would be expected based on the different characteristics of services 
(Graph 3). Charges are often used in the case of nursing homes and social housing 
where the service is clearly individual and can easily be linked to the amount of 
consumption of the service. However, the principle of individuality of services is 
also evident for other services such as home care which is an alternative to nursing 
homes,  but  also  child  care,  adapting  a  dwelling,  providing  personal  assistance, 
elderly day care services – all of them are person-related services and do not create 
considerable  externalities.  Thus,  based  on  the  allocative  efficiency  consideration 132 
explained  previously,  social  services  costs  contain  a  significant  potential  for 
introducing user charges. 
 
One reason why charges are not used in the case of home care services, elderly day-
care and child care services, is that the marginal costs of these services may be 
rather low in some cases. For example, in the case of home care, the service is 
usually provided by an LG-employed social worker on a monthly salary basis, thus 
the costs of the service do not depend directly on the number of service users. 
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Graph 3. User charging practises in the case of different social services offered by 
LGs in Estonia. 
 
Considering  the  principles  that  Estonian  LGs  take  into  account  when  deciding 
whether to charge users of social services or not (see Graph 4), it can be concluded 
that most of them (78% of all LGs) follow the principle of providing emergency care 
free of charge. However, 22% of LGs that charge users for some services do not 
consider this principle important. 
 
The users’ ability to pay is clearly one of the most important factors that limit the 
use of charges. This option was marked by 83% of the LGs not charging users of 
social services and even by 57% LGs that do charge users for some services. 
 
The majority (69%) of LGs applying charges to control the amount of service usage 
and  in  order  to  acquire  information  on  the  number  of  service  users.  Financial 
concerns are indicated by approximately one third of LGs that apply charges for 
some services. 
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Political considerations seem to be least important – very few LGs (3% of LGs not 
charging for any services, and 1% of LGs charging for some services) indicate that 
they do not apply charges due to the resistance by inhabitants (and therefore due to 
the potential risk of losing votes). However, these answers need to be viewed with 
the  caution.  The  respondents  to  the  questionnaire  were  mainly  civil  servants 
implementing  the  policies  designed  at  the  political  level;  therefore  they  do  not 
necessarily reflect the attitude of policy makers. 
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Graph 4. Principles applied in the case of deciding whether to charge or not to 
charge the users of social services (frequency of answers by groups of LGs). 
 
When  looking  at  the  preconditions  of  service  delivery  (see  Graph  5),  usually 
Estonian  LGs  limit  themselves  to  persons  that  do  not  have  family  (i.e. 
(grand)children or (grand)parents) of their own) (91% of LGs charging for some 
services and 74% of LGs not charging). This leads to the situation where some of 
the service users are forced to acquire the service on the open market and some users 
receive the service either on a basis of subsidised charges or completely free from 
LGs, causing an unequal treatment of residents in cases where the family is not able 
or not willing to pay. Also, it fosters an information bias as LGs do not have a full 134 
overview of those in need. Expanding the services to the whole population of the LG 
and introducing a charge for those who are able to pay would allow an increase in 
the  cost-efficiency  as  well  as  equity  of  service  provision.  However,  this  would 
definitely  increase  the  administrative  burden  of  the  LGs  as  they  would  need  to 
evaluate the ability to pay in each individual case. 
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Graph 5. Preconditions of offering services (frequency of answers by groups of 
LGs). 
 
All  other  preconditions  seem  to  be  equally  important  except  for  the  budgetary 
situation in LGs, which is taken as a precondition in only about one third of the LGs. 
During the interviews the respondents clarified that this might be explained by the 
very limited budget of the social services. The budget is so constrained that there is 
no scope to reduce it further and thus if there is a person in need, the means for 
providing the minimum amount of service will need to be found anyway (e.g. “we 
cannot leave the person to die on the street”). 
 
To  summarise,  Estonian  LGs  seem  to  use  charges  either  to  finance  high-cost 
services such as nursing home services or to control the expansion of a service. The 
role of the user charges in providing additional funds to the LG budget is clearly 
underemployed. Also, in applying the principle that local services are offered only 
for those who do not have family and who cannot thus rely on family support, limits 
the potential use of charges as a demand control instrument and hinders equal access 
to the public services. 135 
4.2. Results of statistical analysis 
 
Next we will look at whether the employment of user charges in Estonian LGs can 
be explained by the differences in socio-economic conditions or financial situation 
of the LGs. Those LGs that charge users have more inhabitants on average, but the 
range of values is very wide and standard deviation is high (see Appendix 1). The 
relative importance of elderly people in the whole population is somewhat higher in 
the LGs not imposing charges, but the difference between the smallest and largest 
values and the standard deviation are also bigger in this group. The LGs that charge 
users of social services have a higher income level of inhabitants but at the same 
time lower budget expenditures (without allocations for investments from the state 
budget) per inhabitant on average. The importance of social sphere, and importance 
and volume of social costs for the elderly and disabled, are all somewhat bigger in 
the group of LGs charging users of social services. 
 
However, according to the results of the Mann-Whitney U-Test (see Appendix 2), 
the distribution of a variable can be regarded as different across the groups of LGs 
charging and not charging users of social services in only four cases: 1) importance 
of social sphere, 2) importance of social costs for the elderly and disabled, and 3) 
volume of social costs for the elderly and disabled per inhabitant over 65 years of 
age and 4) per inhabitant over 85 years of age. In all the other cases the distribution 
has  to  be  regarded  as  the  same  across  the  two  groups  of  LGs.  If  we  take  the 
significance level to be α=0,1 instead of α=0,05, then the distribution of population 
and income level of inhabitants can also be regarded as different across the two 
groups of LGs. 
 
To take into account the inconsistencies in the survey answers relating to social 
housing and nursing homes highlighted previously, the statistical analysis is carried 
out  also  in  a  way  that  only  the  LGs  imposing  charges  for  home  care  service, 
personal  assistance,  adapting  a  dwelling,  and/or  elderly  day-care  services  are 
considered as charging the users of social services
6. All the other LGs are treated as 
“non-charging”. To differentiate this classification of LGs from the one used earlier, 
it is called “charge2” and the earlier version is called “charge1”. 
 
According to the survey 103 out of the 225 municipalities included in the statistical 
analysis (45,8%) do not charge users of home care services, personal assistance, 
adapting a dwelling or elderly day-care services, and 122 (54,2%) impose charges at 
least on one of these social services (see Table 1). However, the “non-charging” 
group may contain local governments that do not provide any of these four personal 
social services contained in the analysis (the questionnaire does not enable us to 
distinguish them from the municipalities that provide services but do not charge the 
users). 
 
                                                                  
6 Child care services, social counselling, shelters for the homeless and for abused women and 
children are excluded from the analysis to concentrate on services directed at the elderly and 
disabled people. 136 
Also in the case of using “charge2”, LGs that charge users have more inhabitants on 
average, whereby the difference of means between two groups is bigger than it was 
in the case of using “charge1”. But, as before, the range of values is very wide and 
standard deviation is high. In general the outcomes do not differ much from those 
obtained when using “charge1” (see Appendix 1). 
 
Table 1. Classification of municipalities on the basis of charging the users of social 
services 
Classification  Non-charging  Charging  Total 
No. of LGs  %  No. of LGs  %  No. of LGs 
“Charge 1”  73  32,4  152  67,6  225 
“Charge 2”  103  45,8  122  54,2  225 
 
However, the results of the Mann-Whitney U-Test are rather different than before 
(see Appendix 2). When using “charge2” only the distribution of population and 
income level of inhabitants can be regarded as different across the two groups of 
LGs. In all the other cases it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis and so the 
distribution has to be regarded as the same across the groups. The conclusion does 
not change if we take the significance level to be α=0,1 instead of α=0,05. 
 
Later on, we controlled the probability of charging on socioeconomic conditions of 
the  LG  with  the  help  of  logistic  regression.  The  general  form  of  the  logistic 
regression used in the paper is as follows: 
 
Logit (charge) = B0+∑BiXi, 
 
where charge is “charge1” or “charge2” depending on the particular model and Xis 
are variables described above. 
 
The  results  of  the  logistic  regression  analysis  depend  on:  the  classification  of 
municipalities  (“charge1”  or  “charge2”);  on  the  stepwise  method  used  (Forward 
Stepwise  Likelihood  Ratio  (LR),  Forward  Stepwise  Wald,  Backward  Stepwise 
Likelihood  Ratio  (LR)  or  Backward  Stepwise  Wald);  and  on  the  municipality 
characteristics  included  in  the  analysis.  Variables  with  strong  (r>0,7)  and 
statistically  significant  correlations  (see  Appendix  3)  were  not  inserted  into  the 
models  together.  Substituting  popul65  with  popul85  and  socvolpop65  with 
socvolpop85 in the models did not produce considerably different results, so only 
popul65 and socvolpop65 were used in the models. 
 
Three different combinations of variables were used in the models: 
model 1: popul, popul65, INC, budgvol, socimport, socvolpop65, 
model 2: popul, popul65, INC, budgvol, eldsocimport, and 
model 3: popul, popul65, INC, budgvol, socvolpop65. 
 
The  final  set  of  variables  remaining  in  these  models  in  the  case  of  different 
classifications of municipalities (“charge1” or “charge2”) and after using different 137 
stepwise methods (forward LR, forward Wald, backward LR or backward Wald) is 
given in Table 2 and Appendix 4. 
 
Table 2. Variables in the equation 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Charge1 
Forward  LR  -  -  - 
Wald  -  -  - 
Backward  LR  INC, socimport  INC, eldsocimport  popul, 
socvolpop65 
Wald  INC, socimport  INC, eldsocimport  - 
Charge2 
Forward  LR  INC, socimport  INC, eldsocimport  INC 
Wald  INC, socimport  INC, eldsocimport  INC 
Backward  LR  popul, INC, 
socimport 
popul, INC, budgvol, 
eldsocimport 
INC, budgvol, 
socvolpop65 
Wald  INC, budgvol, 
socimport 
INC, budgvol, 
eldsocimport 
INC, budgvol, 
socvolpop65 
 
As can be seen, none of the variables is included in the final equation in all possible 
cases. In most cases income level of inhabitants (INC) and one of the measures of 
the  importance  of  social  costs  (socimport,  eldsocimport,  or  socvolpop65)  are 
present.  In  almost  all  of  these  cases  the  coefficients  for  INC,  socimport, 
eldsocimport,  or  socvolpop65  appear  to  be  significantly  different  from  0,  at  the 
significance level of 0,05. The odds ratio for a unit change in INC lies between 
1,003 and 1,005 and its 95% confidence interval ranges from 1,000 to 1,008. This 
means  that  when  local  budget  receipts  from  personal  income  tax  per  inhabitant 
increase by one euro, the increase in the odds of charging the users of social services 
is up to 0,8%.
7 Also the increase in the proportion of social protection expenditures 
or social costs for the elderly and disabled in the local budget tends to increase the 
odds of charging the users of social services. However, the size of their influence 
cannot be specified based on the data used because of the very wide 95% confidence 
intervals. A unit change in socvolpop65 cannot be associated with a change in the 
odds of charging the users of social services as its confidence intervals include the 
value 1. 
 
In  addition  to  these  variables  population  and  local  budget  expenditures  per 
inhabitant are also present in some equations, but a unit change in these variables 
cannot be associated with a change in the odds of charging the users of social 
services as their confidence intervals include the value 1. Relative importance of 
people over 65 years of age in the whole population of the municipality (popul65) 
does not appear in any of the equations. 
                                                                  
7 In cases when the confidence interval includes the value 1 (i.e. no change in odds), it cannot 
be concluded based on the data used that a unit change in INC is associated with a change in 
the odds of charging the users of social services. 138 
However, none of the estimated models fits the data well as the values of -2logL of 
the final models are high (near 300) and not remarkably smaller than the values of 
-2logL for the models containing only a constant. The values of the Cox & Snell R
2 
and the Nagelkerke R
2 (below 0,1) show that only a very small part of the variation 
in the dependent variable is explained by these logistic regression models. 
 
The  results  of  the  logistic  regression  analysis  are  in  general  consistent  with  the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U-Test. The probability that a municipality will charge 
users of social services tends to be larger if the income level of its inhabitants is 
higher and the social costs are larger in volume or in proportion to the budget’s 
expenditures.  A  larger  population  may  also  increase  the  probability  that  the  LG 
charges users of social services but the results are not robust. At the same time the 
proportion of elderly people does not seem to have any influence on the decision to 
charge users of social services. However, as the estimated models do not fit the data 
well, it may be expected that there are some other important factors that influence 
the decision of LGs to charge or not to charge the users of social services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of the current paper was to explore the determinants of charging users of 
local social services, based on the example of a small, unitary, highly centralised, 
post-soviet country. In a highly centralised country with rising social expenditures 
increasing  LG  revenues  with  the  help  of  user  charges  would  create  additional 
income for service development and allow control over the expansion of services. It 
would create potential to enhance the efficiency of service delivery and increase the 
quality of services. 
 
The results of the survey among local governments in Estonia show that two thirds 
of local governments charge for some social services. However, the practice is rather 
divergent  among  the  service  areas,  as would  be  expected  based  on  the different 
characteristics  of  services.  In  some  services,  like  nursing  care,  user  charges  are 
extensively used; in other cases, such as shelters for homeless and abused persons 
and personal assistants for disabled people, the charges are seldom applied. 
 
LGs present the users’ inability to pay as a reason for not charging users. However, 
as the service is often limited to persons who do not have families and therefore 
could not rely on family support, LGs often do not have a full overview of the actual 
demand for the service and service users who would be able to pay for services are 
forced  to  find  the  service  on  the  open  market.  Splitting  the  demand  between  a 
publicly offered service and a market-based service may lead to the inefficient use of 
resources. The ability to pay  may also depend on social security systems, either 
private or public. Social insurance or life insurance schemes against the risks of 
nursing care or disabilities may considerably improve the service users’ ability to 
pay. 
 
LGs justify the application of user charges mainly by the need for information and 
demand control. Financial motivation is only mentioned by one third of the charging 139 
municipalities.  Thus,  the  efficiency  consideration  and  co-financing  of  service 
provision  that  could  reduce  the  financial  burden  of  social  costs  are  still  not 
acknowledged. 
 
The results of the logistic regression analysis and of the Mann-Whitney U-Test show 
that if the local budget receipts from personal income tax per inhabitant is higher, 
the  municipality  is  more  likely  to  charge  users  of  social  services.  So  the  first 
hypothesis set up in the introduction (municipalities with higher income level of 
inhabitants tend to apply user charges more) can be considered proven. The second 
hypothesis (larger municipalities tend to employ user charges more) is not supported 
by the findings. Although the U-Test showed that the distribution of population can 
be  regarded  as  different  across  two  groups  of  LGs,  the  results  of  the  logistic 
regression analysis revealed that the change in the number of inhabitants of the LG 
cannot  be  associated  with  a  change  in  the  odds  of  charging  the  users  of  social 
services. The results of the analysis indicated that the probability of charging users 
of social services tends to be higher if the social costs are higher in volume or in 
proportion  to  the  budget’s  expenditures.  However,  as  the  estimated  logistic 
regression models did not fit the data well, it may be concluded that LG charging 
policies depend largely on factors not considered in the statistical analysis. 
 
The current article showed that there are no strong statistical relations between the 
financial and population characteristics of the municipalities and their decision to 
charge for local social services. This indicates that further aspects and factors need 
to be investigated, to include positive theories of charging fees such as forms of 
service  provision  (production  structures)  and  competitive  situations  within  and 
across the municipalities which may play an important role in charging policy. 
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Appendix  2.  Comparison  of  variable  distributions.  Hypothesis  Test  Summary, 
Mann-Whitney U-Test  
 
H0: the distribution of the variable 
is the same across groups  
Variable  Value of U-test 
  Charge1  Charge2 
Popul  ,062**  ,045* 
popul65  ,533  ,303 
popul85  ,799  ,872 
INC  ,092**  ,007* 
Socimport  ,025*  ,106 
Eldsocimport  ,008*  ,144 
Budgvol  ,837  ,511 
socvolpop65  ,012  ,211 
Socvolpop85  ,013  ,315 
*-significant at the level α=0,05 
** - significant at the level α=0,1 
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Appendix 4. Variables in the Equation 
 
Charge1 
  B  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower  Upper 
Model 1 
Forward (LR)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Forward (Wald)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Backward (LR) 
INC  ,003  4,174  ,041  1,003  1,000  1,007 
Socimport  6,125  4,143  ,042  456,920  1,255  166415,666 
Constant  -1,225  2,347  ,125  ,294     
Backward (Wald) 
INC  ,003  4,174  ,041  1,003  1,000  1,007 
Socimport  6,125  4,143  ,042  456,920  1,255  166415,666 
Constant  -1,225  2,347  ,125  ,294     
Model 2 
Forward (LR)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Forward 
(Wald)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Backward 
(LR) 
INC  ,003  3,492  ,062  1,003  1,000  1,006 
eldsocimport  6,597  3,625  ,057  732,664  ,824  651720,072 
Constant  -,814  1,310  ,252  ,443     
Backward 
(Wald) 
INC  ,003  3,492  ,062  1,003  1,000  1,006 
eldsocimport  6,597  3,625  ,057  732,664  ,824  651720,072 
Constant  -,814  1,310  ,252  ,443     
Model 3 
Forward (LR)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Forward 
(Wald)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
Backward 
(LR) 
popul  ,000  1,551  ,213  1,000  1,000  1,000 
socvolpop65  ,001  2,897  ,089  1,001  1,000  1,003 
Constant  ,290  1,405  ,236  1,337     
Backward 
(Wald)  Constant  ,733  26,527  ,000  2,082     
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Appendix 4 (continued). Variables in the Equation 
 
Charge2 
  B  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower  Upper 
Model 1 
Forward (LR) 
INC  ,005  7,923  ,005  1,005  1,001  1,008 
Socimport  6,245  5,520  ,019  515,509  2,816  94358,834 
Constant  -2,265  8,682  ,003  ,104     
Forward (Wald) 
INC  ,005  7,923  ,005  1,005  1,001  1,008 
Socimport  6,245  5,520  ,019  515,509  2,816  94358,834 
Constant  -2,265  8,682  ,003  ,104     
Backward (LR) 
Popul  ,000  1,861  ,173  1,000  1,000  1,000 
INC  ,004  5,672  ,017  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Socimport  6,349  5,743  ,017  571,932  3,179  102890,591 
Constant  -2,179  7,926  ,005  ,113     
Backward 
(Wald) 
INC  ,005  9,252  ,002  1,005  1,002  1,008 
Budgvol  -,001  2,852  ,091  ,999  ,998  1,000 
Socimport  6,160  5,668  ,017  473,245  2,970  75411,961 
Constant  -1,398  2,407  ,121  ,247     
Model 2 
Forward (LR) 
INC  ,004  6,600  ,010  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Eldsocimport  5,871  3,960  ,047  354,553  1,092  115078,475 
Constant  -1,743  6,464  ,011  ,175     
Forward (Wald) 
INC  ,004  6,600  ,010  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Eldsocimport  5,871  3,960  ,047  354,553  1,092  115078,475 
Constant  -1,743  6,464  ,011  ,175     
Backward (LR) 
Popul  ,000  1,470  ,225  1,000  1,000  1,000 
INC  ,004  5,777  ,016  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Budgvol  -,001  2,667  ,102  ,999  ,998  1,000 
Eldsocimport  6,387  4,809  ,028  593,943  1,971  178981,250 
Constant  -,862  1,075  ,300  ,422     
Backward 
(Wald) 
INC  ,005  8,081  ,004  1,005  1,001  1,008 
Budgvol  -,001  3,227  ,072  ,999  ,997  1,000 
Eldsocimport  6,219  4,555  ,033  501,976  1,661  151660,406 
Constant  -,863  1,095  ,295  ,422     146 
Model 3 
Forward (LR) 
INC  ,003  4,807  ,028  1,003  1,000  1,006 
Constant  -1,133  3,497  ,061  ,322     
Forward (Wald) 
INC  ,003  4,807  ,028  1,003  1,000  1,006 
Constant  -1,133  3,497  ,061  ,322     
Backward (LR) 
INC  ,004  7,254  ,007  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Budgvol  -,001  4,381  ,036  ,999  ,997  1,000 
socvolpop65  ,001  4,562  ,033  1,001  1,000  1,003 
Constant  -,487  ,379  ,538  ,614     
Backward 
(Wald) 
INC  ,004  7,254  ,007  1,004  1,001  1,007 
Budgvol  -,001  4,381  ,036  ,999  ,997  1,000 
socvolpop65  ,001  4,562  ,033  1,001  1,000  1,003 
Constant  -,487  ,379  ,538  ,614     
 
 
 